The effects of the Tupamaros (MLN) and Sendero Luminoso (SL) on the political systems of Uruguay and Peru has been significant enough that any study of the political development of these countries must include an examination of their role in the political transformation of Peru and Uruguay. To the American observer it may seem that the brutal and vicious tactics of SL make it nothing more than another Maoist inspired guerrilla/terrorist group that is doomed to follow in the violently disastrous footsteps of other Latin American guerrilla organizations. The MLN also may be quickly dismissed as a far flung image-conscious terrorist group whose briefly effective, publicity-oriented terrorism helped it to temporarily harass the government of Uruguay. Rather than ignore the rise of SL, and the effects of the MLN, and discount their efforts as those of criminals, a comparison will be applied to these movements to discern the basis of their successes and failures. By examining the activities of an insurgent group it is possible to find valuable information regarding the stability of regimes that insurgents face. In this case, it seems that SL has grown in power while the Peruvian government has failed to realize that its hold on government is severely threatened. In contrast, the relatively quicker reaction of Uruguay's military to the MLN threat led to the formation in Uruguay of a B-A regime with the military at the helm.

This paper will proceed by examining the effects of the Tupamaros and Sendero Luminoso on government by analyzing (1) the success of the MLN and SL with regard to the differing objective conditions present in Uruguay in 1968-72 and Peru in 1980-1991; (2) an evaluation of government responses to insurgent activity; (3) and finally, an evaluation of the tactics of SL and the MLN¹ to better understand the long term viability of SL and the failure of the MLN.

From the outset, the MLN's emergence was hampered by the demography of Uruguay which stood as a hindrance to an effective insurgency campaign, "...Uruguay had almost no peasantry and scarce rural labor; indeed, 88 per cent of its population was concentrated in rural towns and in the capital."² In addition, the geography of Uruguay was unfavorable to a guerrilla campaign, lacking mountainous or jungle regions, "...the Tupamaros realized that there were no places in the Uruguayan territory where a durable, rural guerrilla foco could be established..."³ Lacking a significant rural base from which to gain supporters, the MLN was forced to stage most of its activity in the city, specifically the capital of Uruguay- Montevideo. Due to the concentration of Uruguayans in cities, about 80 per cent lived in towns, half in Montevideo, the MLN was left with no choice but to concentrate on gaining a foothold in the capital.⁴

In fact, the MLN saw certain advantages in a strategy that called for control of the urban areas. The Tupamaros believed that the proximity of their activities to the urban masses whose support they wished to obtain would naturally allow them greater chances for exposure thus enabling the MLN to increase support. Furthermore, the MLN believed that the high level of politicization that existed in Montevideo would be more accommodating to their movement than that of the rural areas. The MLN hoped to capitalize on the sympathies of alienated city dwellers whose real incomes were declining as a result of Uruguay's inflation, "Inflation in the year 1967-68 reached 136%; 104% was estimated for the year ending in July 1973."⁵ According to a report by the Uruguayan Institute of Economy, 

Montevideo for 1972 is 24% lower than the maximal salary for 1962 and 19.2% lower than the average for the years 1950-67. In the public sector, salaries are 21.6% lower than the maximum for 1967, and 18.4% lower than the average for the years 1961-67. In relation to 1971, the salaries are lower than 1972 by 18%⁶

The MLN supposed that the increasing economic instability, and the decline in wages would drive the discontented middle and lower classes into their fold. MLN leaders also thought that the active labor and student unions of Montevideo with their high level of political participation would naturally be led into supporting the MLN as the unions failed to improve economic conditions. However, the MLN failed to mobilize the middle class and the labor movements, which it had expected to dissuade. In explaining the inadequacy of the MLN in gaining this support, Fernando Lopez-Alves has suggested that:

Gains obtained by labor through party politics in the past were still a very fresh memory in the minds of the working class; therefore, blue-collar workers (and most of the middle class), remained loyal to the two major political parties. At bottom, the option the Tupamaros offered was not appealing to urban groups who strongly believed in reform elections.⁷

Eventually, it was the MLN's over-confidence in mobilizing the support of the middle class and labor movements that led to its demise.

The comparative strength of Sendero Luminoso to that of the MLN may be equated with the contextual factors which have made their movement much more viable. For instance, only 11% of Peru's territory is not jungle or mountainous highland.⁸ These geographical conditions favor the success of a rural guerrilla campaign. The literature supporting the successes of rural guerrilla warfare which engenders larger bases of peasant support against the relative failures of urban insurgent campaigns like that of the Tupamaros which have failed to garner wide support is well documented.⁹ The findings of Fernando Alves-Lopez regarding the makeup of SL seem to support this finding in that SL has mobilized the rural support necessary to muster a prolonged 'popular war,' "...(Regarding Shining Path) The composition of the Peruvian group shows a majority of landless peasants and recruits coming from marginal sectors of the rural and urban economies, together with a minority of middle class members."¹⁰

Sendero Luminoso has also been strengthened by the fact that it has found support amongst the approximately 250,000 secondary school graduates who are denied admission to Peru's universities each year, and among the hundreds of university graduates who cannot find employment commensurate with their education. These educated members have further consolidated their support through their ability to speak Quecha, the native language of Peru's indigenous majority, "...the fact that Sendero recruiters speak Quecha have made the Shining Path a formidable if not unconquerable enemy in less than a decade."¹¹ The fact that SL finds its roots amongst the university faculty and students of the University of Huamaga who were largely the descendants of Indian peasants, has allowed it to form strong bonds amongst the Quecha speaking Indians. Furthermore, the leadership of SL was able to infiltrate and control student and faculty organizations during the 1970s,¹² and this along with the effort by SL to educate and intermarry amongst the Indian population during the period it was underground from 1974-1980 has allowed it to recruit greater numbers of peasants.

Of course, SL has also capitalized on the immiserated condition of the peasantry which is in part a result of Peru's poorly performing economy. Peru has had only four years of economic growth in the last fourteen years.¹³ During this time period, wages have slipped considerably, and as of late 1989, real wages were on average 52 per cent below 1970 levels.¹⁴ Furthermore, the sharp decline in Peru's economy has exacerbated its debt crisis, and the threat of not gaining access to new loans has become a possibility, "In 1988, Peru became the only Latin American country at risk of censure or even expulsion for arrears on its debt to the IMF, and the World Bank..."¹⁵

This economic decline has sharply effected the highland Indians of Southern Peru where SL claims its strength, "Peru's southern highlands are a region in a Third-World country where poverty is a Fourth World levels."¹⁶ These areas are largely populated by subsistent agricultural or pastoral communities, even though the high altitude and rocky soil make these lands ill suited for farming. This condition combined with the high population growth of this area has created a situation in which, "...land is scarcer in Peru than in any Latin American country except Ed Salvador."¹⁷ Furthermore, food production dropped sharply in the southern mountain regions during the early 1980s leading to widespread malnutrition, "As of 1980, individuals in these zones were consuming as little as 420 calories a day."¹⁸ This has resulted in a rise in the traditional resentment of the predominately white, coastal, Spanish speaking areas by the Quecha speaking Indians. The history of hundreds of years of domination by Spanish speaking coastal whites is emphasized by SL in its unique brand of Peruvian, Marxist-Maoist dialectical history, and used to explain the plight of the Indian. By the early 1980s this indoctrination had led to the entrenchment of SL in these Southern mountain areas.

Why was the government/military able to wipe out the MLN in less than three months after it had struggled to combat the guerrillas for almost four years prior to their defeat? Some have suggested that the MLN's acquiescent period prior to the 1971 elections allowed the military to prepare for a 'final confrontation' with the Tupamaros,¹⁹ while some have pointed to the lack of support amongst the urban middle and working classes. Others have pointed to the rise of the military in controlling government decisions during the crisis of 68-72 as a key to the establishment of a military/government partnership that made vital strategic decisions that defeated the Tupamaros.

The MLN's truce with the government, and the subsequent opportunity it gave the military to prepare its forces with little distraction (other than the unrest surrounding the election which came from sources other than the MLN) seems to provide a logical starting point for analyzing the downfall of the Tupamaros. During the MLN's voluntary truce with the government, beginning with the September 9, 1971 jailbreak of 109 Tupamaros from the Punta Carretas Penitentiary, ²⁰ the control of the war against the guerrillas was given completely to the army. Initially, this move had little visible effect for the Tupamaros did not resume terrorist activity until April 14 when they assassinated several government officials in Montevideo. Immediately, President Pacheco called for an 'internal war' against the MLN and essentially placed Uruguay under martial law. Included in the declaration of 'internal war' were the establishment of the, "...Emergency Laws which permitted the detention of individuals without habeas corpus; censorship prohibited reporting the Tupamaro name or its activities in the press."²¹ By censoring reportage of MLN activities, the government virtually eliminated the MLN's most effective tool- publicity as propaganda. Without the press, the MLN's tentative link to the urban population of Montevideo was substantially weakened. Furthermore, the ability of the military to detain anyone and everyone gave the military the opportunity to make mass arrests and use torture to obtain information from prisoners both of which greatly weakened the MLN.

Associated with the growing presence of the military in suppressing the MLN and the suspension of law was an increase in the use of violence by the military, "...given carte Blanche and unhampered by judicial or constitutional restraints, proceeded to employ repressive techniques that moved far beyond those that any administration had dared to employ..."²² The brutal repression, interrogations, and mass imprisonments were too much for the MLN, and it was defeated by a well prepared military which needed only three months to suppress its major enemy. In the three months following the April 14 assassinations, "...the army enjoyed almost total success against the guerrillas, all but destroying their infrastructure, and detaining thousands of suspects and active supporters."²³ The great success the military had against the MLN, the rapid victory it achieved, the increasing importance it played in supporting the government, and its expanded role in making government decisions ultimately led it to take over the Uruguayan government in 1973.

It has been theorized that the MLN was the most significant factor in the military take-over of 1973, 

perhaps even initiating military intervention in Uruguay was highly significant. Not only because they provided an excuse for the army's intervening in a state of internal turmoil and subversion, but also because in reality there was no alternative.²⁴

However, there are other factors that should be included in tracing the military's success. For example, the military had been involved in Uruguayan politics long before its open war with the MLN, "...the involvement of the military in politics, first in strikebreaking and then in the war against the guerrillas, produced unstoppable momentum for their final takeover of power."²⁵ In addition, the efficiency and decisiveness which the military displayed during its destruction of the MLN contrasted sharply with Uruguay's weak government which seemed unable to defeat the MLN or improve economic conditions, "With the new confidence gleaned from their experience with counterinsurgency, the military saw civilian politicians as either corrupt or ineffective, and were thus able to justify seizing power..."²⁶ The new military government which was established in 1973 was represented until 1976 by, "...military officers and agrarian interests, represented by President Bordaberry,"²⁷ thus the coup coalition which Guillermo O'Donnell has described as central to the formation of a B-A government was established.

In explaining the rise of the military, it was shown that in the period following the military take over, military leaders perceived the inefficient civilian government officials as representative of a corrupt regime. In fact, during the first eighteen months of their rule they, "...spent much of their time...attempting to 'eliminate corruption'..."²⁸ Following this transitory period, during which the military solidified its hold on the government by issuing emergency orders and suppressing dissent with mass imprisonments, Uruguay was seen to possess most of the key characteristics of the B-A model forwarded by O'Donnell: Uruguay improved conditions for foreign investment, registered gains in growth rates while real wages declined, and popular participation in government was reduced. The government also closed many newspapers deemed anti-regime, and banned 'leftist' organizations.

Unlike the government of Uruguay who recognized the threat of the MLN and moved against it quickly once it had time to consolidate and plan during the 1971 truce, the government of Peru has startlingly failed to make any effective effort to stop SL. Many inside Peru and abroad have realized that SL has become a parallel power with the Peruvian government, especially in the drug-laden Huallaga Valley. For example,

Beginning in November 1988, visitors allowed in by Shining Path to observe local conditions report that Shining Path acts as the de facto authority in many areas, exercising police functions and maintaining courts, schools, and health facilities.²⁹

Furthermore, SL has succeeded through its terror campaign in intimidating most people in its controlled zones from voting, or participating in government. An estimated one third of the approximately 4,000 local justice of the peace posts remained unfilled because of a lack of applicants.³⁰ In addition, the government has shown that it cannot even effectively deal with those terrorists it has caught, "Despite the rising violence, Peruvian courts convicted only 5 percent of the suspected terrorists who were brought to trial last year."³¹ In short, SL has established itself in the areas it controls as a substitute government and has prevented the government from intruding into these zones by killing all government trespassers. Moreover, SL has unequivocally proven itself to be a more than potent opponent to the Peruvian military forces.

Unexplainably, the Peruvian government has been very slothful and relatively unconcerned with disposing of SL as evidenced by the low allocation of resources to meet this end. The Peruvian government did not "...declare a total war on the Shining path until May of 1989...it appropriated the sum of $21 million to carry on the struggle."³² By spending so little on the campaign against the guerrillas, the Peruvian government and the military have allowed SL to effectively sever the Huallaga valley from the rest of Peru, and since this area is responsible for the growth of approximately half of the worlds coca,³³ SL has been able to reap great rewards monetarily while creating a solid foco from which to base future operations against the cities of Peru. This strategy falls in line with the final stage of SL's plan to encircle the cities through rural control.

SL's almost uncontested control of the Huallaga has allowed it to provide a very well entrenched force against the government, yet the increasing concern of the U.S. in removing drug traffickers and SL has still not motivated president Fujimori to move forcefully against the rebels. Within Peru, Peruvian journalists like, Mariela Balbi, have blamed Fujimori almost exclusively for SL's success, "The worst thing [he] is doing is not paying any attention to the anti-subversion battle...he is closing his eyes to reality."³⁴ The military has also suffered from Fujimori's indifference to the war against SL and because it lacks the manpower and resources necessary to extricate the insurgents, it has become cautious and ineffective. Rachel Ehrenfeld has underscored this assertion by revealing that, "In the Upper Huallaga, police and army units rarely venture from their garrisons...ten policemen a month are murdered in the valley."³⁵ Much like the American experience in Vietnam where the Vietcong were often unseen and used sneak attacks to instill great fear and timidity in their American opponents, SL has achieved the same results, "One specialist on the issue said that the Peruvian military does 'sloppy detective work and has little intelligence' and spends less time protecting the population from SL than trying to protect itself.³⁶" Peru has also suffered from the indifference of Peru's prior presidents who like Fujimori, ignored the rise of SL,

The administration of Fernando Belaunde Terry, for example, virtually ignored Peru's drug problem despite repeated warnings from U.S. officials and diplomats. The succeeding government of Alan Garcia not only ignored the warnings at first, but also plunged Peru into ruinous economic policies that made its fight against narco-terrorism a feeble and unwinnable affair.³⁷

Notwithstanding the proposed expansion of U.S. support, the beleaguered Peruvian government has seemingly weakened in the face of SL. In fact, it may be suggested that without the support of the U.S., a victory over SL will be impossible because of the steady income which SL derives from the Colombian drug trade. In contrast with Peru's $21 million military budget, SL's intake from the drug trade may double this amount in months, judging by the large shipments of coca paste which have been seized leaving the Huallaga.³⁸

While Peruvian journalist and academicians like Rachel Ehrenfeld have placed blame on the government for failing to effectively organize against SL, others have blamed the military's preoccupation with other matters, "To this day the military still believes the main enemy remains Chile and not the Sendero Luminoso, much less the Tupac Amaru."³⁹ Thus, the Peruvian government both ineffectual and ineffective has allowed a serious threat to its control to continue its growth. Contrasted with the strategically planned and decisive attack that the Uruguayan military leveled against the MLN, Peru's military has much to learn.

The tactics of the MLN seem to fit into two phases, the first stage being from 1968-October of 1971 when the MLN frequently engaged in political terrorism through kidnappings of highly placed political and industrial elites. The MLN augmented this strategy with a series of robberies to provide funds for arms and supplies since they, like SL had little international support, "...overseas influences had little impact on the group and its evolution. The Tupamaros developed feeble international connections."⁴⁰ It was not just a lack of support that isolated the MLN, for they saw their movement in nationalist terms, "...the MLN conceived its struggle as one led by Uruguayans for Uruguayans."⁴¹ With this view in mind, it is not surprising that the most widely used Tupamaros slogan was, "Habra patria para todos o patria para nadie."⁴² This nationalist sentiment led the MLN to engage in high visibility actions like assasinations and the already mentioned robberies which were portrayed as attacks on the corruption of the Uruguayan elites. The MLN sought to portray these actions as an effort by their movement to rid Uruguay of this social evil for the good of the masses.

A tactic which the MLN used with great effectiveness during the robberies of the first phase was to steal sensitive documents regarding government officials and elites along with the cash. During the 1969 Financiera Monty bank robbery, the MLN, "...unearthed some highly confidential account books that supplied evidence of the misuse of public funds and the secret formation of an illegal cartel."⁴³ The subsequent publication of this data led to a few resignations and seemed to undermine even further Uruguay's civilian government. The falling support for the ruling government led the MLN to believe that it could gain from a possible leftist victory in the elections of 1971. Furthermore, the elder MLN leaders had never conceived of terrorism as a permanent part of the movement, "...the 'viejos,'...developed ideological justifications for terror in which terrorism was perceived as one link in a broad, general revolutionary strategy..."⁴⁴ Thus, the fact that the MLN abandoned terrorist activities for five months is not surprising in hindsight.

In the second phase, beginning in October of 1971, the MLN declared a truce with the government in order to support the newly formed left wing coalition Frente Amplio in the elections of that year. This decision proved to be a fateful one, for the MLN had always supported armed insurrection as the means of taking power, and they had been pressing their drive for power ever forward with highly publicized kidnappings and robberies in the period prior to the election. By calling a truce, the MLN weakened the position it had gained vis a vis the government- a position that was to continue to weaken following the election.

Although the MLN stated that it was cautious in its support of the election by stating that, "We will be patient as long as the process is truly democratic and one of transformation. But if the Frente Amplio becomes bureaucratic and fence-straddling...we'll go back to the armed struggle,"⁴⁵ it had not anticipated that voters would be driven toward supporting the conservative Colorados by the violence they espoused. The Colorados ran their campaign with an appeal to order and calls for the destruction of the Tupamaros, and in fact, "...most of the population preferred to express discontent by turning to more conservative choices..."⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Frente Amplio became associated with the violence of the MLN because of its Marxist leanings, and this led many to support the Colorados "...the overwhelming majority of Uruguayans totally rejected armed revolution. 88% of leftist supporters thought that the problems of the country should be solved while preserving law and order."⁴⁷ In effect, the terrorist lean of the MLN increased the division between itself and its potential supporters.⁴⁸ Following the elections, the Tupamaros were quickly defeated by military forces who had been preparing for the final conflict with the MLN during the MLN's truce of October 1971 to April 1972.

It will take much longer than three months to defeat SL however, since SL has been able to actually become part of the native population. They have extended deep roots into the Indian society through inter-marriage and by infusing Andean myths and traditions with their revolutionary teachings in order to associate the domination of the Spanish speaking conquerors of yore with the present day efforts of the Peruvian government to keep the campesinos immiserated. Furthermore, by emphasizing the education of the Indians, SL has succeeded in convincing many that the domination of the universitites by the government is much like the monopolization of the Spanish language that the Spaniards used to exclude the Indians from politcal participation and social advancement in earlier centuries.

Notwithstanding the contextual differences, and the mobilization strategies, SL and the MLN seem to have used similar terrorist tactics, although SL has added a few innovations- like the killing of non-cooperative peasants, which is usually considered a guerrilla sin. During the year of 1984 alone, over 1500 civilians were killed.^{49 (see graph)} SL has been, "...ruthless, killing suspected informants first and asking questions later..."⁵⁰ Sendero has also added another strategically questionable tactic to its repertoire- the destruction of facilities that benefit the local population in order to exacerbate the problems of the peasantry, thus making the government seem even more powerless to aid them.

The fear that this bloody reign has instilled into the peasantry may be seen in the power of SL's decrees in regions it controls (which now number 56 of 181 provinces of Peru,⁵¹

In mid-May of 1988 when the Shining Path issued an 'armed strike' order to cease work for three days in Peru's heartland, an estimated one million Peruvians obeyed that order, which effectively cut off food, energy, and export minerals from three provinces to Lima-The government in reaction did nothing.⁵²

Further evidence of SL's influence was seen during former President Alan Garcia's 1988 visit to Huancayo, "Huancayo to give the visiting President Alan Garcia the cold shoulder. By day, the president saw only a few sullen people on the streets. The night was punctuated with dynamite explosions."⁵³

This rule through fear by SL has actually hurt their movement in some ways, because many campesinos have fled their native lands for the relatively safer coastal areas, "Guerrilla warfare in the Sierra has caused so much social and economic disruption that some communities have been abandoned." ⁵⁴ Mostly however, SL's terror campaign has allowed it unquestioned dominance over the Indian population in most of the Southern mountain region and the Huallaga valley.

SL has also been able to steal large amounts of dynamite from Peru's many mining operations, and consequently it has been responsible for the destruction of vital electrical sources to the cities, causing much economic damage, "Spectacular incidents of sabotage have interrupted normal transportation and electrical transmission to the major metropolitan areas for days at a time crippling industrial production."⁵⁵ In fact, due to the attacks of SL on power lines and government improvement projects, the government and industry have suffered great losses, "Sendero in 1988 alone was responsible for losses estimated as high as $2.65 billion."⁵⁶ Estimates for SL's effect on the economy over its ten year active life span range even higher, "Economic damage caused by ten years of political violence exceeds $17 billion..."⁵⁷

Of course SL has also engaged in typical guerrilla warfare to establish control of areas like the highly valued Huallaga Valley, "although the Senderos remained active in the capital and other major cities by blowing up electric-line pylons (causing extensive blackouts) and by assassinating major political figures, the guerrillas always have made the major effort in the countryside, in good Maoist fashion."⁵⁸

It has been SL's success in the Huallaga that has made its existence disastrously threatening to the Peruvian government.

The ability of SL to tax the drug trade has allowed it to gain a consistently large source of income, weapons, and recruits,

[The Huallaga] is a strategic zone for the country's future. It is strategic because what the subversives want to do here is block all roads and prevent the Huallaga region from being connected to the rest of the country. Colombian airplanes and drug traffickers have direct connections abroad, while the Huallaga Valley is isolated from the country. Large amounts of money are taken from this valley. Subversives also obtain weapons, which are probably brought in by those planes. Young men are probably also recruited here.⁵⁹

The amount of money that SL may take in from taxation of drug sales towers above the $21 million defense budget of Peru, as this low estimate by Rachel Ehrenfeld suggests, "Assuming the Senderos collect a tax of 5 percent, revenues would amount to $35 million annually, a figure that surely underestimates the Shining Path's bonanza.⁶⁰ This monetary windfall from the drug trade has many analysts predicting even more problems for the Peruvian government and military in the future, "With a rapidly building war chest, it is not difficult to imagine that the Senderos soon will be purchasing far more sophisticated war material to continue their attack on an increasingly beleaguered regime."⁶¹ However, SL's ability to obtain these weapons may actually be somewhat difficult because of their isolation from any outside support.

Like the MLN, SL has little or no contact with groups or governments outside of Peru. SL has taken a firm position against, "...Soviet and Cuban 'revisionism.' Sendero also distrusts Nicaragua, North Korea, and virtually all other communist regimes."⁶² Unlike the MLN who espoused support for the Frente Amplio SL has refused conciliation or association with any other left wing organization. SL has killed Soviet and Chinese envoys as well as members of Peru's other major revolutionary group the Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru (MRTA). SL has described MRTA as, "...the principal enemy of the revolution...that must be confronted because there cannot be the triumph of two revolutions."⁶³ To this end, SL has murdered hundreds of members of Peru's other Marxist organizations, including the MRTA.

At its peak in 1970, the Tupamaros claimed a membership of 20,000 in a population of 2,556,000.⁶⁴ Yet within two years, this organization was completely eliminated. As Fernando Lopez-Alves has concluded, the reasons for this quick fall from grace, "...were closely related to the failure to consolidate support amidst large segments of the Uruguayan urban middle and working classes."⁶⁵ The objective conditions found in Uruguay in 1968-1972 should not be underestimated either. The lack of a rural foco, and the inability to gain support amongst urbanites all contributed to the quick downfall of the MLN. The truce of October 1971 to April of 1972 has also been shown as a decisive turning point in the downfall of the MLN. Furthermore, the terrorist activities which brought the MLN to prominence eventually legitimized the Military's brutal suppression of their movement, "...the use of revolutionary violence by the MLN legitimized the implementation of similar methods by the government; torture, indiscriminate killing, the illegal use of mass media..."⁶⁶ In turn, the rise of the military within government, and its efficiency in quelling the MLN led it to view itself in a more confident fashion, especially in contrast to the civilian government which had been exposed by the MLN as corrupted and weak. Eventually the military's greater sense of purpose led to its 1973 takeover of Uruguay's government which precluded the B-A establishment which followed.

Unlike Uruguay, Peru faces a desperate situation today, and unless the U.S. provides the $36 million in aid for drug interdiction efforts it has promised, the prospects for democracy look bleak in Peru, "...the survival of Peru as a democracy depends on the ability of the Peruvian government to dismantle Shining Path."⁶⁷ Sendero Luminoso has a well established command structure and is deeply entrenched and well hidden in Peru's rural areas. They have expanded peasant support in the 1980s, and have obtained the military initiative from the weakened government. Finally, SL's consistent ability to obtain large amounts of capital from the coca trade has bolstered its position significantly.

Sendero Luminoso has been more successful than the MLN in its length of activity, the area it controls, its ability to continually obtain resources vital to the movement, and most importantly its ability to activate a larger, more loyal peasant base which has allowed it to disappear when necessary. Unlike the MLN, SL has also been able to completely remove government influence from large sectors that it controls, thus the 'parallel government which the MLN spoke of but never really obtained due to its inability to mobilize the urban middle and lower classes has actually been established by SL. Unless Sendero Luminoso is included in America's 'war on drugs,' it is hard to believe that the Peruvian government will be able to defeat it.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

1. This paper has chosen to ignore a discussion of the makeup of the MLN and SL, instead it accepts the evidence provided by studies like that of Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley who in his exhaustive study of Latin American guerrilla organizations of 1950-1990 has evidenced that these groups are mainly comprised of, "...young, usually in their twenties, with a slightly older leadership...with little variation in ages...overwhelmingly male in the 1960s...with increasing female participation in the 1970s and 1980s," P.29. Wickham Crowley goes on to suggest that in the initial stages of L.A. Guerrilla movements, they are headed by the, "...offspring of the highly educated rural elites and the urban middle and upper classes...with subsequent involvement of peasants whose numbers predominate...power remaining in the hands of those with status and education." P.29. This acceptance of Crowley-Wickham's evidence rests on the basis of his thorough investigation and the belief that in this contrasting study, the criterion mentioned above will yield more definite conclusions about the successes and failures of SL and the MLN.

Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), P. 29.

2. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1989, P. 212.

3. Arturo C. Porzecanski. Uruguay's Tupamaros the Urban Guerilla. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), P. 15.

4. Robert Moss. Urban Guerillas. (London: The Trinity Press, 1972), P. 211.

5. Edy Kaufman. Uruguay in Transition From Civilian to Military Rule. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1979), P. 24.

6. Ibid, P.24.

7. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, P. 222.

8. No Author Given- The Latin American Bureau. Peru Paths to Poverty. (Great Britain: Latin American Bureau, 1985), P. 4.

9. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956. Mr. Crowley has analyzed 28 guerrilla movements in: Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama using a boolean truth table which judged each movement on the existence of these characteristics: A guerrilla attempt, Peasant/ (worker) support, guerrilla military strength, patrimonial praetorian regime, government loss of U.S. support, and the existence of a social revolution. From this study and others which contrast urban campaigns with those rurally based he has concluded that

rural guerrillas have had greater success than urban guerillas. However, he has cautioned that, "There is no single social condition that predicts peasant support in every circumstance." P.305.

10. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, P. 207.

11. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. (USA: Basic Books, 1990), P. 122.

12. No Author Given- The Latin American Bureau. Peru Paths to Poverty. (Great Britain: Latin American Bureau, 1985), P. 108.

13. David Scott Palmer, "Peru's Persistent Problems," Current History, January 1990, P. 5.

14. Ibid, P. 5.

15. Ibid, P. 5.

16. Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," World Politics, October 1984, P. 59.

17. Ibid, P. 63.

18. Ibid, P. 61.

19. Martin Weinstein. Uruguay the Politics of Failure. (Westport: Greeenwood press, 1975), P. 128.

20. Ibid, P. 128.

21. Edy Kaufman. Uruguay in Transition From Civilian to Military Rule. P. 36.

22. Martin Weinstein. Uruguay the Politics of Failure. P. 128.

23. Ibid, P. 128.

24. Edy Kaufman. Uruguay in Transition From Civilian to Military Rule. P. 37.

25. Charles Guy Gillespie. Negotiating Democracy Politicians and Generals in Uruguay. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), P. 33.

26. Ibid, P. 43.

27. Robert R. Kaufman. "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model." In David Collier ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin Amrica. (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1979), P. 182.

28. Ibid, P. 183.

29. David Scott Palmer, "Peru's Persistent Problems," Current History, P. 32.

30. Ibid, P. 32.

31. Douglas Waller and Michael Smith, "Dueling Death Squads," Newsweek, December 26, 1988, P. 37.

32. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. P. 126.

33. Harry Anderson, Douglas Waller, and Robert Parry, "The Next Nasty War?," Newsweek, May 21, 1990, P. 37.

34. Tom Vogel, Jr., "The 'Karate Kid' Meets the Shining Path," Commonwealth, January 1991, P. 10.

35. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. P. 127.

36. Tom Vogel, Jr., "The 'Karate Kid' Meets the Shining Path," Commonwealth, P. 10.

37. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. P. 118.

38. William A. Hazelton and Sandra Woy-Hazelton, "Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Peru's Struggle Against Sendero Luminoso," Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 6, 1988,December 1989, P. 50.

39. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. P. 127.

40. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, P. 216.

41. Ibid, P. 216.

42. Martin Weinstein. Uruguay the Politics of Failure. P. 120.

43. Robert Moss. Urban Guerillas. P. 225.

44. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, P. 204.

45. Robert Moss. Urban Guerillas. P. 236.

46. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, P. 221.

47. Charles Guy Gillespie. Negotiating Democracy Politicians and Generals in Uruguay. P. 41.

48. Arturo C. Porzecanski. Uruguay's Tupamaros the Urban Guerilla. P. 75.

49. William A. Hazelton and Sandra Woy-Hazelton, "Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Peru's Struggle Against Sendero Luminoso," Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 6, 1988, P. 480-485.

50. Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas," Problems of Communism, September-October 1983, P. 19.

51. David Scott Palmer, "Peru's Persistent Problems," Current History, P. 8.

52. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. P. 126.

53. Ibid, P. 126.

54. William A. Hazelton and Sandra Woy-Hazelton, "Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Peru's Struggle Against Sendero Luminoso," Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 6, 1988, P. 482.

55. Ibid, P. 485.

56. Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, "Sendero Luminoso: Peruvian Terrorist Group," Department of State Bulletin, P. 50.

57. David Scott Palmer, "Peru's Persistent Problems," Current History, P. 10.

58. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Narco Terrorism. P. 122.

59. Ibid, P. 128.

60. Ibid, P. 126.

61. Ibid, P. 126.

62. Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, "Sendero Luminoso: Peruvian Terrorist Group," Department of State Bulletin, P. 50.

63. William A. Hazelton and Sandra Woy-Hazelton, "Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Peru's Struggle Against Sendero Luminoso," Terrorism, P. 483.

64. Fernando Lopez-Alves, "The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence, P. 239.

65. Ibid, P. 210.

66. Edy Kaufman. Uruguay in Transition From Civilian to Military Rule. P. 37.